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sentenced to an indeterminate term at the Utah State
Prison of zero to five years, and six months in the Salt
Lake County jail, such sentences to run consecutively.

MANNY GARCIA
Attorney for Appellant
431 South 300 East, #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent

Case no. 890706-CA
Category no. 2

v.
CHRISTOPHER GRAY
Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

This appeal if from a judgment and conviction
against Christopher Gray for Aggravated Assault, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated,
Section 76-5-103 (1953 as amended), and Unlawful
Detention, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated Section 76-5-304, (1953 as amended).
Appellant was found guilty by a jury on September 15, 1989
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable John A. Rokich,
Judge, presiding.

The final judgment and conviction was

rendered on November 1, 1989, whereby Appellant was
sentenced to an indeterminate term at the Utah State
Prison of zero to five years, and six months in the Salt
Lake County jail, such sentences to run consecutively.

MANNY GARCIA
Attorney for Appellant
431 South 300 East, #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

TEXT OF STATUTES

iv

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

V

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

3

ARGUMENT

4
Point 1:
Point 2:

COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN
REPRESENTING DEFENDANT

4

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION

7

CONCLUSION

8

ii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated Section 77-35-26 (2) (a) (1953 as
amended), and Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3 (2)(f),
whereby a defendant in a District Court criminal action
may take an appeal from a final judgment and conviction of
any crime other than a first degree or capital felony.

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES CITED
State v. Pursifell, 746 P2d 270 (Ut. App. 1987)

4

State v. Kerekes, 62; ? p2d 1 ].6 1 ( Utah 1980 )

7

Strickland v. Washington, 44 6 U.S. 668, 1 0 4 S.Ct.
2052, 80 LEd 2d 674 (1984)

4

STATUTES CITED
Section 76-5-103

Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)

1,1

Section 76-5-304

Utah Code Ann. (I^DJ

i ,]

Section

Utah Code Ann, (1953 as amended)

0-5-102

\ I-

TEXT OF STATUTES
76-5-102:

Assault is: (b) A threat, accompanied by a
show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another.

76-5-103:

Aggravated Assault.- (1) A person commits
aggravated assault if he commits assault as
defined in section 76-5-102 and: (b) He
uses a deadly weapon or such means or force
likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury.

76-5-304:

Unlawful Detention.- (" "
person commits
unlawful detention if he knowingly restrains
another unlawfully so as to interfere
substantially with his liberty.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Was counsel ineffective in representing

defendant by not having defendant testify and in not
calling a potentially helpful witness?

2.

Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the

conviction, or was it inherently improbable so that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
of defendant's guilt?
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Respondent
v.

Case no. 890706-CA

CHRISTOPHER GRAY

Category no. 2

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction
against Christopher Gray, for Aggravated Assam*

: M irl

degree felony, in violation of Utah Cod<=> Anno! a! <jii >(tion
7b-'j-lUJ \ [{VJ1 as amended), and Unlawful Detention, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah rode Annotated
76-5-304 (±ybj c:-->

•

•

. y 1 ound Hi , Gray guilty

of both charges on September 15, 1989, in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt. Lake county,
State of i^-ah, H-i^
presiding.

H<MVM

^h 11* John A

Pokich, Judge,

Judge Rokich rendered the final judgment and

conviction on November l, 1989, and sentenced Mr, Gray to
zero to five year.s in in J 'im

.tnd ,\i\

imoutlis In the Salt

Lake County jail, terms to run consecutively.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On December 11, 1989, defendant, a registered
guest at the Quality Inn, went to the front desk
requesting their shuttle service.
his room.

He left his luggage in

He was directed to speak with a Kathy Merrill,

a former police officer now employed as a security guard
and shuttle driver for the Inn.

(T.68)

After a brief

discussion defendant and Ms. Merrill left in a van.
(T.72).
At trial, Ms. Merrill testified that she had
agreed to take defendant as far as Redwood Road and North
Temple (T.70).

She further testified that while en route,

defendant displayed a holstered handgun (T.75) and
directed that he be taken to an area near 4500 South and
700 East (T.76).

She testified that, at some point en

route, defendant placed the holstered gun on her lap
(T.79) and then placed it on the dashboard (T.80).

She

testified that defendant had her stop at a gas station
where he exited the van, went inside and purchased beer
(T.92), then returned and Ms. Merrill resumed en route.
She testified that defendant gave her ten dollars and left
most of the beer in the van (T.95).
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After dropping defendant off at his desired
d e s t i n a t i o n , M s . M e r r i l l called in to the front d e s k , then
returned to the Ir 1 n, and the 1 1 t he po 1 1ce were ca1led
(T.96).

Defendant w a s arrested at the address where M s ,

M e r r i l l dropped him off and charged as noted a b o v e .

From

that evidence and those c o n v i c t i o n s defendant now a p p e a l s ,

SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T
Defendant c l a i m s his appointed counsel w a s
i n e f f e c t i v e in his representation when he failed to
c o u n t e r the e v i :3 e n c e a g a i i I s t the d e f e n d a n t

c o i I s :i s t :i n g

largely of the testimony of M s . M e r r i l l , by failing to
call defendant *o testify on his owii b e h a l f .
werefilea

No motions

•- : f o r d e f e n d a n t t o t e s t i f y, a n < 3

defendant c o n t e n d s that only his testimony would have
served to counter and a d d r e s s the damaging testimony given
by Ms

Merri ] 1.
Defendant c l a i m s counsel failed to call a

p o t e n t i a l l y helpful w i t n e s s , another shuttle driver w h o ,
def endant prof f ers , wou 1 d have helped cast doubt on M s .
Merrill's credibility.
Defendant further claims the e v i d e n c e given by
M s . Merrill was inherently improbable and so inconclusive
that reasonable m i n d s must have entertained a reasonable
doubt of d e f e n d a n t ' s gi Ii 1 t ,

- 3 -

ARGUMENT
POINT I
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN HIS
REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANT
The right to effective assistance of counsel is
well settled (Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)) and that issue was
addressed by this court in State v. Pursifell, 746 P2d 270
(Ut. App. 1987).

To prevail, the defendant must

demonstrate, first, that counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment, and second, that counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant.
Here, the most damaging testimony against the
defendant came from Kathy Merrill, who testified to being
alone with, coerced, terrified, detained and assaulted by
the defendant, aggravated by the presence of the holstered
weapon.

The only other witness who could relate and

explain critical facts to the jury was the defendant.
Defendant claims his counsel failed to communicate his
trial strategy with him, and failed to take the
appropriate measures necessary to have defendant testify
as defendant expected he would be doing.

- 4 -

Defendant also claims his counsel failed to
investigate and call to the stand a helpful witness who
may have helped cast doubt on some of Ms. Merrill's
testimony.

The anticipated testimony from this witness

would have served to attack Ms. Merrill's credibility by
supporting defendant's contention that he had not forced
her to drive him, but that she had agreed and it was not
contrary to the Inn's policy to do so.

Defendant's point

being that not enough was done by counsel to attack Ms.
Merrill's credibility in support of, and in corroboration
of what defendant's expected testimony would have been.
Defendant claims counsel failed to file the
appropriate motions with the court to protect defendant's
credibility when he took the stand.

For example, since

defendant had no prior convictions that would
'automatically' be admissible against him under Rule 609,
his convictions would require a balancing test under the
rule which counsel failed to ask the trial court to rule
on.
Defendant contends his counsel's judgment fell
below objective reasonable professional standards when he
failed to anticipate and reckon the need for defendant's
testimony and take the appropriate measures, such as
filing those Rule 609 motions, interviewing the potential

- 5 -

witness, and preparing defendant for the witness stand.
Defendant does not imply that he is
second-guessing counsel's strategy, rather he is alleging
that counsel failed to keep him informed regarding his
case, as well as failed to share the case strategy with
him.
Defendant contends his case was prejudiced by
counsel's ineffectiveness and submits as a further
indication of this the fact that the jury requested more
information about defendant and the gun during
deliberations (T.270).

Defendant contends that his

testimony regarding the situation in the van, his
testimony regarding showing Ms. Merrill the gun, coupled
with corroborating evidence and the incredulous testimony
that Ms. Merrill gave (T.155-156), would have in all
likelihood led to a more favorable result for defendant.
Defendant doubts whether a 'cautionary'
instruction to the effect that defendant's right not to
testify should not be held against him would prevent a
jury from concluding defendant must he hiding something or
he would testify.

Here, defendant contends he intended to

testify and only counsel's ineffectiveness prevented him
from presenting himself as well as his entire defense
before the jury.

- 6 -

POINT II
THE TESTIMONY OF KATHY MERRILL WAS SO
INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE AND INCONCLUSIVE
THAT REASONABLE MINDS WOULD ENTERTAIN A
REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO DEFENDANT'S GUILT
The Utah Supreme Court has reiterated status of
the law regarding sufficiency of evidence many times and
states in State v. Kerekes, 611 P2d 1161, 1168, that it is
the defendant's burden to establish that the evidence was
so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime charged.

[This] court will

examine the evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict of
the jury.
Defendant contends that Ms. Merrill's testimony
was improbable and incredible and that reasonable minds
must entertain a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Her
testimony, though uncontroverted due to the issue raised
in Point 1 is highly improbable.

For example, she

testified that defendant left the vehicle, went inside a
store, retrieved and purchased beer; and though she was
unclear whether he left the gun on the dash or not, and
even though she sat behind the wheel with the engine
running, she made no effort to escape, claiming she was

- 7 -

frozen with fear; even though she had been an experienced
police officer.

No effort to escape her threat and

detention rings of the incredulous, when all she need do
is step on the gas.

It could just as easily speak to the

lack of a threat as to an omnipresent threat, and no
threat means no assault and no unlawful detention.
The jury by wanting more information during
deliberations, revealed that questions were present
regarding the presence or absence of a threat and the
sufficiency of the evidence.
Defendant contends the jury ultimately and
unreasonably erred on the side of 'just in case1 and
decided to convict.

Defendant's active participation in

trial may well have countered that fear while addressing
first hand, the evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the appellant,
Christopher Gray, requests that this court reverse his
conviction of Aggravated Assault and Unlawful Detention
and remand his case to the trial court for a new trial or
dismissal of the charges.
Respectfully Submitted this

M&tf__,

f

day of

1990.

MANNY GARCIA1
Attorney for Appellant
- 8 -

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, MANNY GARCIA, hereby certify that eight copies
of the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of
appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114 this

l

day of May, 1990.

^-flANNY GARC

DELIVERED by
this

day of May, 1990.
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a result of plaintiffs' efforts. These findings will support the court's conclusion as
to whether defendant Lund is liable to
plaintiffs under quantum meruit—a contract implied in law, or quantum meruit
—a contract implied in fact, or neither. As
is explained more fully supra, the measure
of damages may differ depending on the
theory adopted.
V. INTEREST
In awarding damages, the applicable legal rate of interest must also be determined. The 1981 amendment to section
15-1-1 increased the legal rate of interest
from 6 percent to 10 percent. Utah Code
Ann. § 15-1-1 (1986).

The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent
v.
Rick PURSIFELL, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 860361-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 2, 1987.

Defendant was convicted by jury in the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, J.
Dennis Frederick, J., of burglary, attempted burglary, theft, and vehicle burglary,
and defendant appealed, alleging he was
denied Sixth Amendment right to effective
[12] The statutory legal rate of interest assistance of counsel. The Court of Apis applied from the date payment is due to peals, Orme, J., held that: (1) trial court's
the judgment date. See Lignell v. Berg, inquiry into defendant's expression Qf dissatisfaction with court-appointed counsel
593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979).
was sufficient; (2) defendant's complaints
[13] The trial court found July 7, 1981, did not warrant substitution of counsel;
the date defendant Lund signed the settle- and (3) defendant failed to sustain burden
ment statement, as the due date, as that of proving ineffective assistance of counwas the date the benefit was conferred. It sel.
was also on this date that defendants acAffirmed.
knowledged an obligation to pay plaintiffs
for their services in constructing the duplexes. We find that this determination is 1. Criminal Law <3=>64U0(2)
supported by substantial evidence and
Indigent defendant has constitutional
therefore will not disturb it on appeal. See right to appointed counsel, but has no conid at 810. Based on this factual determi- stitutional right to lawyer other than one
nation, we find the appropriate rate of in- appointed, absent good cause. U.S.C.A.
terest is 10 percent
ConstAmend. 6.
The May 17, 1985 judgment is affirmed 2. Criminal Law e»641.10(2), 1152(1)
in part and reversed in part The case is
Whether to appoint different lawyer
remanded for further proceedings consist- for indigent defendant who expresses disent with this opinion. Each party to bear satisfaction with court-appointed counsel,
its own costs.
but has no constitutional right to appointment of different lawyer, is matter committed to sound discretion of trial court and
GARFF, and ORME, JJ., concur.
will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
f o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

3. Criminal Law e»641.10(2)
Upon indigent defendant's complaint
concerning court-appointed counsel, court
must balance potential for last minute delay and propensity for manipulation of system against competing concern about likely

STATE v. PURSIFELL
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inability of defendant to articulate and
communicate dissatisfaction in setting that
most laypersons find quite intimidating.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
4. Criminal Law <3=>641.7(1)
Trial court has no duty to routinely
initiate its own inquiry as to whether indigent defendant is satisfied with court-appointed counsel. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
5. Criminal Law <3=>641.10(2)
Upon indigent defendant's expression
of dissatisfaction with court-appointed
counsel, even if trial court suspects that
defendant's requests are disingenuous and
designed solely to manipulate judicial process and to delay trial, trial court must
make some reasonable, nonsuggestive effort to determine nature of defendant's
complaints and to apprise itself of facts
necessary to determine whether defendant's relationship with appointed attorney
has deteriorated to point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such
extent that defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel would be violated but for
substitution. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
6. Criminal Law e=>1166.11(5)
Upon indigent defendant's expression
of dissatisfaction with appointed counsel's
representation, trial court's response in directing follow-up questions to discovery
matter mentioned by defendant, without
inquiring further into concern alluded to by
defendant as to counsel's pretrial preparation, was not reversible error; defendant
had placed emphasis on his concern about
discovery matter and lack of more than one
face-to-face meeting with defense counsel
prior to trial was not necessarily insufficient preparation in routine criminal case.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
7. Criminal Law e=>641.10(2)
Substitute counsel must be appointed
for indigent defendant upon showing of
good cause, such as conflict of interest,
complete breakdown of communication, or
irreconcilable conflict with attorney. U.S.
C.A. ConstAmend. 6.

8. Criminal Law <s»641.10(3)
^trForcing indigent defendant to stand
trial with assistance of attorney with whom
he has become embroiled in irreconcilable
conflict violates defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
9. Criminal Law <3=>641.10(2)
Failure of appointed counsel to notify
defendant that counsel had filed routine
discovery motion until after stipulation had
been entered was not so disadvantageous
as to rise to Sixth Amendment violation
mandating substitution of appointed counsel, even if motion was subjectively important to defendant; routine discovery motion required no input from defendant
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
10. Criminal Law <3=>641.13(1)
Serious lack of preparation might, in
some circumstances, rise to violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective representation.
U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 6.
11. Criminal Law <s=»641.10(2)
Appointed counsel's failure to have
more than one meeting with defendant prior to trial did not warrant substitution of
appointed counsel under Sixth Amendment,
considering fairly routine nature of underlying facts and offenses charged and appointed counsel's experience. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 6.
12. Criminal Law <8=>641.10(2)
Denial of motion for substitution of
court-appointed counsel may be abuse of
trial court's discretion, even though defendant's complaints are not of constitutional
magnitude. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
13. Criminal Law <3=>641.10(2)
Denial of indigent defendant's motion
for substitution of court-appointed counsel,
alleging failure to timely inform defendant
of discovery motion and inadequate preparation, was not abuse of trial court's discretion.
14. Criminal Law e»641.13(l)
To prove ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant must show that specific,
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identified acts or omissions fell outside
wide range of professionally competent assistance and that defendant was prejudiced
as result of alleged deficiencies. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 6.
15. Criminal Law <s=>641.13(3)
Defendant failed to sustain burden of
proving that appointed counsel's performance at trial deprived him of effective assistance of counsel, absent showing that,
but for alleged deficiencies of counsel,
there was reasonable probability that jury
would have decided differently. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 6.
Walter F. Bugden, Jr., Bugden, Collins &
Keller, Salt Lake City, for defendant and
appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, State Atty. Gen.,
Sandra J. Sjogren, Asst. Atty. Gen., for
plaintiff and respondent.
Before DAVIDSON, GREENWOOD
and ORME, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Defendant was convicted of burglary, attempted burglary, two counts of theft, and
two counts of vehicle burglary. On appeal,
defendant claims he was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel in two respects: First, by the trial
court's denial of his request for substitute
counsel and, in that regard, by the court's
failure to inquire adequately into the reasons for defendant's dissatisfaction with
appointed counsel, and second, in the presentation of his defense at trial. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to this appeal are
those relating to defendant's request for
substitute counsel. Following arraignment, Frances Palacios of the Salt Lake
Legal Defenders Association was appointed
to represent the defendant On the morning of the first day of trial, the defendant
informed the court that he did not want to

proceed with Ms. Palacios as his counsel
because he did not "feel that she's done
everything that she could in [his] case."
The trial court asked the defendant to
specify his reasons for thinking that counsel had not represented his interests. Defendant reiterated his general complaint,
mentioned that he had met with counsel
only once, and complained that he had not
received timely notification of a hearing
scheduled on a motion to discover filed by
Palacios. A lengthy exchange ensued concerning the details of the discovery matter,
from which it emerged that the prosecution
agreed to provide the requested discovery
and no hearing was ever held. The court
did not delve further into defendant's earlier statement that he had met with counsel
just once before trial. Nor did defendant
provide any details on that subject during
his remarks about his dissatisfaction with
counsel. Defendant focused exclusively on
the belated receipt of his copy of the discovery notice. The court concluded that,
consistent with her past performance, Ms.
Palacios had done a good job in representing defendant's interests. The court denied defendant's motion for substitute
counsel. Defendant was subsequently
tried before a jury and convicted on all
counts.
REQUEST FOR NEW COUNSEL
[1,2] While an indigent defendant has a
right to have counsel appointed to represent him, Gideon v. Wainvrright, 372 U.S.
335, 344-45, 83 S.Ct 792, 796-97, 9 L.Ed.2d
799 (1963), he does not have a constitutional right to a lawyer other than the one
appointed, absent good cause. See, e.g.,
United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995
(5th Cir.1973). Whether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent defendant
who expresses dissatisfaction with his
court-appointed counsel, but who has no
constitutional right to appointment of a
different attorney, is a matter committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court
and will be reversed only for an abuse of
discretion. Id.
It is suggested on this appeal that, had
the trial court conducted a more extensive

STATE v. PURSIFELL
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inquiry into the reasons for defendant's
dissatisfaction, it would have uncovered a
myriad of complaints about the quality of
defendant's representation. Accordingly,
we consider first the nature and extent of
the court's inquiry and then turn to a consideration of whether, in light of what the
court learned, denial of the motion for substitute counsel violated the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and, if
not, whether it nonetheless constituted an
abuse of discretion.
A. Duty to Inquire
[3] Typically, motions for substitute
counsel are less likely to be granted when
they would result in a significant delay or
mistrial or would otherwise impede the
prompt administration of justice. See
Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 831 (9th
Cir.1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103
S.Ct. 1896, 77 L.Ed.2d 285 (1983). Courts
are also aware of the propensity for manipulation of the process by criminal defendants and some have cautioned that "requests for appointment of a new attorney
on the eve of trial should not become a
vehicle for achieving delay." See United
States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d 712, 717 (2d
Cir.1967).
We fully appreciate the possibility that
defendants will fabricate complaints about
counsel in an effort to promote delay or
otherwise
manipulate
the
system.
Weighed against that realization, however,
must be recognition of the inability of
many indigent defendants, in view of their
level of education and sophistication, to adequately articulate their legitimate complaints involving appointed counsel. Therefore, when a complaint is registered by a
criminal defendant concerning his or her
appointed counsel, the court must balance
the potential for last minute delay and the
propensity for manipulation of the system
against the competing concern about the
likely inability of indigent defendants to
articulate and communicate their dissatisfaction in a setting which most laypersons
find quite intimidating.
1. As indicated, the trial court referred to its
prior, positive experience with Ms. Palacios in
rinding defendant's representation had been adequate. A good overall reputation by counsel is

[4,5] In establishing a standard of inquiry in the context of requests for substitution of counsel, we decline to impose an
affirmative duty on the trial court to routinely initiate its own inquiry, and thereby
in effect solicit grievances from indigent
defendants where no dissatisfaction has
been expressed. Likewise, we decline defendant's invitation to prescribe a checklist
which trial courts must run through if any
indicia of dissatisfaction should emerge.
However, when dissatisfaction is expressed, the court must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine
the nature of the defendant's complaints
and to apprise itself of the facts necessary
to determine whether the defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney
has deteriorated to the point that sound
discretion requires substitution or even to
such an extent that his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be violated but
for substitution. Even when the trial
judge suspects that the defendant's requests are disingenuous and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and to
delay the trial, perfunctory questioning is
not sufficient United States v. Welty, 674
F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir.1982).
[6] On the record before us, we cannot
conclude that the quality of the trial court's
inquiry did not meet this standard. Defendant expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel's representation. Appropriately, the court inquired about the "specific way" in which defendant's interests
had not been represented. Defendant did
mention he had met with counsel only once,
but focused his remarks on the discovery
matter. As a result, the court's follow-up
questions of defendant and counsel were
exclusively devoted to that matter. It
clearly would have been preferable had the
court inquired further into the other concern alluded to by defendant, namely the
extent of counsel's pretrial preparation.1
Failure to do so, however, was not reversino substitute for careful inquiry by the court
since there is no guaranty even an excellent
attorney, especially a very busy one, has not
botched a particular case.
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ble error in view of the emphasis defendant
placed on his other concern and since a
single, face-to-face meeting before trial is
not, in itself, indicative of a lack of preparation in cases like the instant one.2
B. No Constitutional Violation
[7,8] Having determined that the
court's inquiry into defendant's complaints
was sufficient under the circumstances, we
next consider whether the complaints themselves disclosed problems of a constitutional dimension. Of course, courts have no
discretion to allow a violation of the Sixth
Amendment. Substitution of counsel is
mandatory when the defendant has demonstrated good cause, such as a conflict of
interest, a complete breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict with
his or her attorney. United States v. Weity, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir.1982); McKee
v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir.1981),
cert denied, 456 U.S. 917, 102 S.Ct 1773,
72 L.Ed.2d 177 (1982). When a defendant
is forced to stand trial "with the assistance
of an attorney with whom he has become
embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict," he
is deprived of the "effective assistance of
any counsel whatsoever" and his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is violated.
Brown v. Craven, A2A F.2d 1166,1170 (9th
Cir.1970). See United States v. Hart, 557
F.2d 162, 163 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 434
U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct 305, 54 L.EA2d 193
(1977).

counsel was inadequately prepared. While
it is true that defendant did not receive
notice of the discovery motion filed by defense counsel until after a stipulation had
been entered, the routine discovery motion
required no input from defendant. Though
the motion might have been subjectively
important to defendant, "[g]ood cause for
substitution of counsel cannot be determined 'solely according to the subjective
standard of what the defendant perceives.' " Thomas v. Wainwright, 767
F.2d 738, 742 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting
McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d at 932), cert
denied, 475 U.S. 1031, 106 S.Ct. 1241, 89
L.Ed.2d 349 (1986).
[10,11] A serious lack of preparation
might, in some circumstances, have such a
disadvantageous effect on a defendant's
representation as to rise to a constitutional
violation. In this case, defendant conceded
that he met with counsel on at least one
occasion prior to trial. In view of the fairly
routine nature of the underlying facts and
offenses charged, and defense counsel's experience, the fact that counsel met with the
defendant only once before trial is not necessarily indicative of a lack of preparation.
See Note 2, supra. Therefore, defendant's
complaints did not warrant substitution of
counsel as a matter of constitutional law.3

C. No Abuse of Discretion
[12,13] This determination, however,
does not end our analysis. While a defendIn viewing defendant's remarks in a light ant's complaints may not be of constitutionmost favorable to him, it is clear from the al magnitude, denial of the motion may,
record that his dissatisfaction with appoint- under some circumstances, nonetheless
ed counsel was not so substantial as to rise constitute an abuse of discretion. As we
to a constitutional level requiring the ap- have previously stated, however, defendpointment of new counsel.
ant's complaints in this case were insub[9] As indicated, we discern only one stantial. While it might have been preferrspecific complaint registered by defendant able to delve deeper into defendant's arguin this case, i.e., that counsel was derelict able claim of inadequate preparation, the
in notifying defendant of a discovery mo- failure to do so was neither a constitutional
tion, and arguably a complaint that defense violation nor an abuse of discretion.
2. The charges against defendant and the factual
setting in which they arose would be a matter of
routine for an experienced criminal defense attorney. Multiple interviews might have given
defendant more of a sense that a committed
advocate was diligently working on his behalf,

but would not necessarily have furthered his
cause.
3. Defendant's constitutional arguments are limited to the United States Constitution and we are
not asked to consider whether the Utah Constitution requires more.
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QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
[14] Unsuccessful motions for substitution of counsel are typically followed by the
claim that defendant received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Wainivright, 767 F.2d 738 (11th
Cir.1985); Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826
(9th Cir.1982). This case is no exception.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),
the United States Supreme Court established the standard for determining claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.
To prevail, the defendant must demonstrate, first, that counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and second,
that counsel's performance prejudiced the
defendant. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted and
interpreted the Strickland standard for determining ineffective assistance claims.
See, e.g., State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401
(Utah 1986).
Under the first prong of the Strickland
test, defendant must show that "specific,
identified acts or omissions fall outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance." State v. Frame, 723 P.2d at
405. As we have previously stated, however, "this court will not second-guess trial
counsel's legitimate use of judgment."
Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1040
(Utah CtApp.1987) (citing Codianna v.
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1110 (Utah 1983)).
See State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 205
(Utah 1976).
We need not consider whether defendant's complaints4 were "sufficient to overcome the strong presumption that counsel
rendered adequate assistance and exercised
'reasonable professional judgment,' " State
v. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690, 104
S.Ct at 2066), because we are able to decide this case solely on the second prong of
the Strickland test. We need not decide
whether counsel's performance was defi4. Specifically, defendant claims counsel was deficient in (1) failing to challenge the propriety of
defendant's initial detention; (2) failing to challenge the unnecessarily suggestive identification

cient if defendant fails to satisfy his burden of showing that he was prejudiced as a
result of the alleged deficiencies. Id.
"The object of an ineffectiveness claim is
not to grade counsel's performance. If it
is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, . . . that course should be followed." Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct at 2069.
[15] Pointing to little more than his conviction, defendant has suggested on appeal
that he was prejudiced as a result of counsel's performance. However, "an unfavorable result does not compel a conclusion of
ineffective assistance of counsel." State v.
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. In demonstrating
prejudice, it is not enough to show that the
alleged errors "had some conceivable effect
on the outcome" of the trial but, rather, ,
defendant must show that a " 'reasonable
probability exists' that, but for counsel's
error, the result would have been different." Id. "Reasonable probability" is defined as "that sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the verdict."
Id. See also State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168
(Utah 1985); State v. Lenzing, 688 P.2d
492 (Utah 1984).
Defendant has failed to show that but
for the alleged deficiencies of counsel there
is a reasonable probability that the jury
would have decided differently. Accordingly, his convictions are affirmed.
DAVIDSON and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
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procedure; and (3) in failing to impeach the
identification testimony of a witness with a prior inconsistent statement.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,

Richard Karl KEREKES, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 16489.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 16, 1980.

Defendant was convicted before the
Third District court, Salt Lake County, Ernest F. Baldwin, J., of th^ft by deception,
and he appealed. The Supreme Court,
Stewart, J., held that: (1) testimony by
witnesses as to their conversations with defendant in another state relating to a plan
for a business operation, were admissible as
such plans constituted an early step in the
effectuation of the criminal scheme that
was consummated in Utah, and admissibility of such testimony was therefore not governed by rule prohibiting admission of prior
acts; (2) evidence of operation of fruit juice
business by defendant in another state was
admissible to establish defendant's intent
and modus operandi in prosecution for similar business activities in Utah, as the similarity of the two operations, their proximity
in time, and their peculiarity served to establish defendant's intent and knowledge
regarding the illegal nature of the operation; and (3) evidence demonstrated that
the defendant exercised control over investors' property and created a false impression that machines, when paid for, would be
ordered and delivered, and knowingly promised performance which he did not intend to
deliver.
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law <s=>406(7)
Testimony by witnesses as to conversations between themselves and defendant re-

lating to the business operation which gave
rise to charges of theft by deception constituted admissions by the defendant concerning his criminal intent, and were admissible
under the admissions of a party exception
to the hearsay rule; thus they were not
subject to the foundation requirements of
rule admitting hearsay statements of coconspirators made in the course of a conspiracy. Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(7, 9).
2. Criminal Law <s=> 1036.5, 1044.1(5)
Where defendant did not object or
move to strike as hearsay testimony by
witnesses as to statements attributed to
third parties, he could not raise the issue on
appeal.
3. Criminal Law <£=>374
Evidence of prior acts of a defendant,
admissible when relevant to prove some
other material fact than his disposition to
commit crime, such as motive or intent, is
subject to a determination by the trial
judge that its probative value is not outweighed by the possibility of undue prejudice. Rules of Evidence, Rule 55.
4. Criminal Law <s=>369.2(6)
Testimony by witnesses as t * their conversations with defendant in Arizona relating to a plan for a business operation in
Utah which subsequently gave rise to
charges of theft by deception, was admissible, as such plans constituted an early step
in the effectuation of the criminal scheme
that was consummated in Utah, and admissibility of such testimony was therefore not
governed by rule prohibiting admission of
prior acts. Rules of Evidence, Rule 55.
5. Criminal Law <s=>370, 371(1)
Evidence of operation of Arizona fruit
juice business by defendant was admissible
to establish defendant's intent and modus
operandi in prosecution for similar business
activities in Utah, as the similarity of the
two operations, their proximity in time, and
their peculiarity served to establish defendant's intent and knowledge regarding the
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illegal nature of the operation. Rules of
Evidence, Rule 55.
6. Criminal Law <s=>371(l), 372(1)
Evidence of a defendant's prior acts,
admissible to establish defendant's intent
and modus operandi, need not necessarily
rise to the level of a criminal offense.
Rules of Evidence, Rule 55.
7. Criminal Law <s=> 1038.2, 1038.3
Failure of defendant to request a jury
instruction or object to the lack of an instruction that evidence of prior bad acts
must be shown by clear and convincing
proof precluded the issue from consideration on appeal. Rules of Evidence, Rule 55.
8. Criminal Law <3=>507(1)
An "accomplice" is one who is also
criminally liable for the conduct charged.
U.C.A.1953, 76-2-202.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
9. Criminal Law <s»507(l)
Mere presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make one an accomplice
when he neither advises, instigates, encourages, or assists in perpetration of the crime.
U.C.A.1953, 7&-2-202.
10. Criminal Law <3=»59(1)
Even if one has lent aid and encouragement, voluntary abandonment of his participation prior to the commission of the crime
relieves him of criminal liability for its commission, providing the abandonment was
communicated to the remaining parties and
occurred prior to a time when the crime had
become so inevitable that its commission
could not reasonably be stayed. U.C.A.
1953, 76-2-202.
11. Criminal Law <s=>507(l)
Prosecution witness, who took part in
early discussions with defendant relating to
planned business operation which gave rise
to charges of theft by deception, was not an
"accomplice" in the crime for which defend-

ant was charged and convicted, as the record indicated that witness* decision to abandon all involvement in the illegal activity
was made and communicated long before
the commission of the crime; thus corroboration of his testimony by other evidence
was not required. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-202,
77-31-18.
12. Criminal Law <s=>511.1(6)
Where first witness corroborated testimony of accomplice that defendant was involved in the planning of a vending machine scheme, second witness described how
defendant paid her and two others to sign
incorporation papers to avoid having the
names of the real owners made public, and
employees of the business testified as to
defendant's involvement with the business
operation, the accomplice's testimony was
sufficiently corroborated to support defendant's conviction. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-202, 7731-18.
13. Crimina] Law G=>5U2
Although corroborating evidence sufficient to support a defendant's conviction
need not go to all the material facts as
testified to by the accomplice, nor need it be
sufficient in itself to support a conviction,
the corroborating evidence must connect
the defendant with the commission of the
offense and be consistent with his guilt and
inconsistent with his innocence. U.C.A.
1953, 77-31-18.
14. Embezzlement <s=>52
Where defendant's conduct did not stop
at merely offering to sell property with an
intent not to deliver it or delivering to a
customer a lesser quantity or commodity or
service, but also involved taking money
from investors for the purchase of fruit
juice vending machines and exercising control over that money with a crimina) intent
to permanently deprive them of it and not
deliver a machine at all, his conduct clearly
constituted a theft offense and not merely a
deceptive business practice, and therefore
rule requiring a lesser punishment where
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there is doubt as to the applicable statute
was not applicable. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-405,
76-6-507.
15. Criminal Law e=> 1144.13(2), 1159.2(7)
It is the defendant's burden on appeal
to establish that the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the
crime charged, and Supreme Court will review the evidence and all inferences which
may be reasonably drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the verdict of the
jury.
16. Embezzlement <s=>44(l)
Evidence in prosecution for theft by
deception, including fact that defendant received over $25,000 from investors who did
not receive the machines for which payment
was made, demonstrated that the defendant
exercised control over investors' property
and created a false impression that machines, when paid for, would be ordered and
delivered, and knowingly promised performance which he did not intend to deliver, and supported guilty verdict. U.C.A.
1953, 76-6-405.
17. Embezzlement <®=»26
In light of facts that Criminal Code
provides that the offense denominated
"theft" embraces the separate offenses previously known as larceny, embezzlement,
false pretenses, and others, and that there
was substantial evidence of theft by deception, was not improperly charged with theft
by deception rather than theft by embezzlement. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-403, 76-6-405.

Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., of Salt Lake Legal
Defenders Association, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Robert R.
Wallace, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff and respondent.
1. AH statutory references are to Utah Code
Ann. (1953), as amended.

STEWART, Justice:
Defendant appeals from his conviction by
a jury of eleven counts of theft by deception in violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-405.1 We
affirm.
There was sufficient evidence to justify
the jury in believing the following: In 1976
defendant became involved with Rex Parsons and certain other persons in planning a
scheme to sell vending machines. The price
was to be paid in advance, but, except for
some early deliveries to give the appearance
of a legitimate business, the machines
would not actually be delivered to investors.
Such a scheme was established in Arizona,
and subsequently a business enterprise
known as Fruit Juice, Inc., and Fruit Juice
of Salt Lake was incorporated in Utah.
The business used a phone solicitation approach to find people willing to invest money to purchase and place one or more fruit
juice vending machines that would yield a
monthly profit. Employees were hired by
defendant and others to make the calls and
to follow up by meeting with interested
persons. Office managers ran the day-today operation of the business. Defendant
commuted from Arizona and spent one or
two days a week at the Salt Lake City
business offices.
Vending machines were sold and delivered to some investors. A number of people, however, signed contracts and paid for
the machines but did not receive them.
Eleven of these persons were complaining
witnesses named in the information. They
testified that when they became concerned
about the business' failure to deliver their
machines, they unsuccessfully tried to contact Fruit Juice, Inc., and eventually became aware that it was no longer conducting business. In fact, the office was closed
down and business ceased in August 1977.
Defendant was charged with and convicted
of theft by deception.
Defendant asserts in the alternative that
his conviction should be reversed, that he
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should be granted a new trial, or that he
should be sentenced pursuant to the lesser
violation of fraudulent business practices,
§ 76-6-507. He relies on the following four
contentions: (1) testimony of co-conspirators was erroneously admitted; (2) testimony of accomplices was not corroborated; (3)
defendant's punishment should have been
based on § 76-6-507 because it is more specific regarding the illegal conduct alleged
and has a lesser penalty than theft by deception; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict.
We consider first defendant's challenge
to the admission of the testimony of Rex
Parsons and Howard Woodall, who are
characterized as co-conspirators. Their testimony supported the State's characterization of Fruit Juice, Inc., as a front for a
scheme to obtain money from investors and
then leave town without delivering the
promised machines. Parsons testified that
he was the person who presented to defendant the idea to set up the scheme in Arizona, and later Parsons and defendant came
to Salt Lake City to establish a similar
operation. Woodall testified that he took
part in some of the initial conversations in
Arizona about the plan, but that he discontinued his contact with the defendant and
Parsons and had no part in the subsequent
operation, either in Arizona or Utah. Woodall's testimony as to his noninvolvement
was uncontradicted.

ators falling within this exception must be
predicated upon independent evidence of
the existence of the conspiracy, apart from
co-conspirator hearsay declarations. State
v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941).
[1] Defendant has, however, improperly
characterized the nature of the challenged
testimony, and his objection to its admissibility is without merit. Parsons and Woodall testified primarily to statements constituting admissions by the defendant concerning his criminal intent. Out-of-court
statements of a party are not subject to the
foundational requirements of Rule 63(9) but
are admissible pursuant to Rule 63(7), which
embodies the age-old common law exception to the hearsay rule known as an admission of a party.

Defendant contends that the damaging
statements contained in the testimony of
these two men, whom be characterizes as
co-conspirators, lacked proper foundation
and were inadmissible hearsay statements.
Rule 63(9)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, entitled "Vicarious Admissions," allows the admission of hearsay statements of co-conspirators made in the course of a conspiracy.2
Defendant properly asserts that the admissibility of hearsay statements of co-conspir-

[2] Defendant concedes the admissibility of testimony by the witnesses as to what
they themselves did or said and as to what
the defendant did or said. But defendant
contends that the testimony of Parsons and
Woodall was "tainted" when placed in context with testimony as to what persons
other than the defendant or the witnesses
were doing or saying during the course of
the alleged conspiracy. Defendant has not,
however, cited any objectionable testimony
by Parsons or Woodall as to third-party
out-of-court statements. The only statements attributed to third parties were volunteered by the witnesses, and no valid
objection or motion to strike was made in
response to them. These included out-ofcourt statements allegedly made by Bill
Wilson, who had been involved in a similar
scheme in Colorado, and an attorney named
Dick Berry, who advised the group on incorporation requirements. These statements
were made not to Utah investors but only
within the small group of original organizers. In the absence of a valid objection or
motion to strike, the admissibility of hearsay may not be raised on appeal.

2. That rule provides for the admissibility of,
[a]s against a party, a statement which
would be admissible if made by the declarant
at the hearing if * * * (b) the party and the
declarant were participating in a plan to

commit a crime or a civil wrong and the
statement was relevant to the plan or its
subject matter and was made while the plan
was in existence and before its complete execution or other termination
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[3] Defendant further contends that the
testimony of Parsons and Woodall regarding activities that took place in Arizona was
inadmissible under Rule 55 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.3 That rule proscribes
evidence of another crime or civil wrong
unless it is relevant to prove certain material facts, such as motive, intent, plan, or
knowledge. State v. Daniels, Utah, 584
P.2d 880 (1978). Evidence of prior acts
admissible under Rule 55 is also subject to a
determination by the trial judge that its
probative value is not outweighed by the
possibility of undue prejudice. State v.
Gibson, Utah, 565 P.2d 783 (1977).

[5] Defendant also argues that evidence
of the actual operation of the Arizona fruit
juice business was subject to Rule 55 and
that the State did not establish the required
foundation for its admissibility. However,
Parsons testified that he and the defendant
were among those who intended to "take
the money and run" once the business became established. They sold and delivered
some machines to investors, but failed to
deliver machines to others and kept the
purchase price. The Arizona scheme was
terminated when an associate absconded
with the funds collected.

It is the sound policy of the law that
evidence of prior crimes may not be admit'
ted to show the propensity of a defendant
to commit another crime. But in situations
where evidence of other crimes or wrongs is
particularly relevant in proving a specific
element of the crime for which the defend'
ant is on trial, the evidence may be allowed
for that purpose. See State v. Lopez, 22
Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 880 (1978), State v.
Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961).

[6] Evidence of defendant's prior acts
similar to those charged in this case was
admissible to establish defendant's intent
and modus operandi. Such evidence need
not necessarily rise to the level of a criminal
offense. United States v. Simmons, 503
F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1974).

[4] As to the testimony regarding plan'
ning meetings which took place in Arizona,
defendant's argument based on Rule 55
misses the mark. The testimony of Parsons
and Woodall concerning discussions and
meetings in Arizona related directly to the
plan for the Salt Lake City operation, which
itself gave rise to the criminal charges
against defendant This evidence is not
governed by Rule 55 because it constituted
an early step in the effectuation of the
criminal scheme that was consummated in
Salt Lake City.
3. Rule 55 provides:
Other Crimes or Civil Wrongs. Subject to
Rule 47 evidence that a person committed a
crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion,
is inadmissible to prove his disposition to
commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for
an inference that he committed another
crime or civil wrong on another specified
occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48,
such evidence is admissible when relevant to
prove some other material fact including absence of mistake or accident, motive, oppor-

The similarity of the Arizona scheme arvd
the Salt Lake City activities, their proximity in time, and their peculiarity serve to
establish defendant's intent and knowledge
regarding the illegal nature of the operation. Therefore, this evidence was admissible under Rule 55. Cf. Weeks v. United
States, 313 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1963).
[7] Defendant further asserts that as a
prerequisite to the admission of evidence of
prior wrongdoing for any permissible purpose, it is necessary to show by clear and
convincing proof the illegality of the prior
act.4 We do not find it necessary in this
case to reach the issue of the burden of
proof regarding evidence of prior wrongdotunity intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or
identity.
4. For this assertion defendant relies on two
federal cases, United States v. Broadway, 477
F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973), and United States v.
Beechum, 555 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1977). But
these cases were overruled by United States v.
Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), on the
ground that they were incompatible with Rule
404(b), Federal Rules of Evidence, which deals
with the admissibility of evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts. Rule 404(b) provides:
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ing. No instruction on the burden of proof
was submitted by defendant and none was
given to the jury. Defendant's failure to
request a jury instruction or object to the
lack of an instruction that evidence of prior
bad acts must be shown by clear and convincing proof precludes the issue from consideration on appeal.
Defendant also contends that the testimony of Parsons and Woodall was accomplice
testimony that was not corroborated as required by § 77-31-18, which, though later
amended, was applicable to the present offense. Section 77-31-18 provided:
A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself and without the aid of the testimony
of the accomplice tends to connect the
defendant with the commission of the
offense; and the corroboration shall not
be sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.

relieves him of criminal liability for its commission providing the abandonment was
communicated to the remaining parties and
occurred prior to a time when the crime had
become so inevitable that its commission
could not reasonably be stayed. Harrison v.
State, Ind., 382 N.E.2d 920 (1978); People v.
Rybkz, 16 IlL2d 394, 158 N.E.2d 17 (1959);
Hendtick v. State, 229 Ind. 381, 98 N.E.2d
906 (1951); State v. Peterson, Minn., 4
N.W.2d 826 (1942). On these principles,
Woodall was not an accomplice. Although
Woodall took part in early discussions in
Arizona, the record indicates that his decision to abandon all involvement in the illegal activity was made and communicated
long before the commission of the crime for
which defendant was charged. Woodall
therefore could not be said to be an accomplice in the crime for which defendant was
herein charged and convicted.

[12] The State concedes Parsons' status
as an accomplice. Parsons' testimony, however, was without question sufficiently cor[8-11] An accomplice, as defined by roborated to support defendant's conviction.
§ 76-2-202,5 is one who is also criminally Woodall corroborated the testimony that
liable for the conduct charged. State v. defendant was involved in the planning of
Berg, Utah, 613 P.2d 1125 (1980); State v. the vending machine scheme. A Dorothy
Cornish, Utah, 560 P.2d 1134 (1977). Mere Pulley described how defendant paid her
presence, or even prior knowledge, does not and two others to sign the incorporation
make one an accomplice when he neither papers to avoid having the names of the
advises, instigates, encourages, or assists in real owners made public. Employees of the
perpetration of the crime. State v. Gee, 28 business testified as to defendant's involveUtah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (1972). Neverthe- ment with the Salt Lake City operation.
less, even if one has lent aid and encourage- The business records indicated the receipt
ment, voluntary abandonment of his partic- of large amounts of moneys from the busiipation prior to the commission of the crime ness by both defendant and Parsons.
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.—Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
The later Beechum case held that the rule
called for a two-step test: first, it must be
determined that the evidence is relevant to an
issue other than the defendant's character, and
second, that the evidence possesses probative
value that is not substantially outweighed by

undue prejudice. However, Beechum did not
require that the illegality of prior wrongs be
shown by clear and convincing proof.
5. Section 76-2-202 provides as follows:
Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for conduct of another.—
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense
who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for such conduct
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[13] This Court has previously stated dell based its decision on the rule "that
that the corroboration need not go to all the where there is doubt or uncertainty as to
material facts as testified to by the accom- which of two punishments is applicable to
plice, nor need it be sufficient in itself to an offense an accused is entitled to the
support a conviction. However, the corrob- benefit of the lesser."
orating evidence must connect the defend[14] Application of the Shondell stanant with the commission of the offense and dard, requiring a lesser punishment when
be consistent with his guilt and inconsistent there is doubt as to the applicable statute, is
with his innocence. See State v. Christean, not appropriate in the present case. ReadUtah, 533 P.2d 872 (1975); State v. Vigil, ing the theft and deceptive business prac123 Utah 495, 498, 260 P.2d 539, 541 (1953); tice statutes, there is no doubt or uncertainState v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 ?2d 285 ty as to which of the two statutes is appli(1941). Based on these standards, Parsons' cable to the facts of this case.
testimony was sufficiently corroborated.
The crimes described in § 76-6-507 are
distinguishable from the crime of theft by
Another contention made by defendant is deception as committed by the defendant.
that he should have been punished pursuant The deceptive business practices defined as
to the provisions of § 76-6-507, which pro- criminal include using or possessing for use
scribes deceptive business practices, because a false weight or measure; selling or delivit is more specific regarding the illegal con- ering less than the represented quantity or
duct for which defendant was convicted and quality of a commodity or service; making
has a lesser penalty than theft by deception. a false or misleading statement in an adverDefendant argues that where there are two tisement addressed to the public; offering,
statutes which proscribe the same conduct, by advertising or other means of communiand one is more specific with regard to the cation to the public, property or services
allegations charged than the other, it is with intent not to sell or provide the advernecessary that a defendant be prosecuted tised property or services at the offered
under the more specific statute. Also, if price or in a sufficient quantity or at all; or
two statutes proscribe the same conduct other acts not relevant here.
and one statute has a lesser penalty than
Defendant has not specified which subthe other, the defendant may only be pun- section of the deceptive business practice
ished to the extent of the lesser penalty. statute he relies upon in seeking the imposition of a lesser penalty, and we are unperDefendant cites State v. Shondell, 22 suaded that any of the conduct proscribed
Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1965), which therein is the equivalent of the charges for
involved an analysis of the drug abuse con- which defendant was convicted. Defendtrol law and the Narcotics Drug Act, both ant's conduct did not stop at merely offerenacted during the same session of the 1967 ing to sell property with an intent not to
Legislature. Shondell had been charged deliver it or delivering to a customer a
with possession of the drug LSD, a misde- lesser quantity of a commodity or service.
meanor under the drug abuse control law He took money from investors for the purand a felony under the terms of the Narcot- chase of fruit juice vending machines and
ic Drug Act. This Court held that the exercised control over that money with the
clear, specific, and lesser penalty prescribed criminal intent to permanently deprive
for the offense of possession of LSD was them of it and not deliver a machine at all.
applicable, rather than the more severe pen- This conduct clearly constitutes a theft ofalty provided by overlapping provisions of fense and not merely a deceptive business
6
the Narcotic Drug Act. The Court in Shon- practice.
6. We do not, of course, mean to say that any
businessman who fails to deliver merchandise
or services according to a contract is guilty of
theft by deception. A theft conviction requires

proof of the intent to illegally and permanently
deprive one of his property, not merely of a
breach of the terms of a business agreement.
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[15] Defendant's final contention is that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
conviction. It is defendant's burden to establish that the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime
charged. State v. Daniels, Utah, 584 P.2d
880 (1978). This Court will review the evidence and all inferences which may be reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury. Id.
[16] Defendant contends that the State
did not show that defendant exercised control over anybody's property or that he created or confirmed an impression of fact
that was false. We find, to the contrary,
that the record amply supports the jury
verdict in this case. The defendant received over $25,000 paid directly to him or
to his wife for one day's work a week over a
period of a few months. This money came
irom investors w\io did not receive t\ie machines for which payment was made. Defendant's participation in the business had
substantial support in the record. Defendant paid three persons not otherwise connected with the business to sign the incorporation papers. He also hired employees,
participated in setting up the Salt Lake
City office, directed employees, held sales
meetings, controlled the finances and
signed checks, and authorized payment for
machines. He was not under the supervision of any other business associates. The
evidence clearly showed that defendant's
plan was knowingly to create a false impression that machines, when paid for,
would be ordered and delivered, and knowingly, to promise performance which he did
not intend to deliver.

"theft'' embraces the separate offenses previously known as larceny, embezzlement,
false pretense, and others not relevant here.
The vgrdict of theft by deception on eleven
counts finds substantial support in the record.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
WILKlNS and HALL, JJ., concur.
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Lessee of a backhoe appealed from a
\YJ] Finally, defendant's contention that
the State should have charged theft by judgment of the Third District Court, Salt
embezzlement rather than theft by decep- Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., entered
tion is without merit. Section 76-6-403 of for lessor in lessor's action brought to rethe Utah Criminal Code enacted in 1973 cover unpaid rentals due under the lease
provides that the offense denominated and the cost of repairs made on the backhoe

